Human Preferences and Risky Choices

Paul Van Schaik,Asgeir Juliusson,Petko Kusev

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00333

Abstract

EDITORIAL article Front. Psychol., 15 November 2011Sec. Cognition volume 2 - 2011 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00333

Highlights

Would reflect any relevant constraints in cognitive resources. In this Parducci demonstrates that range-frequency theory implies that spirit, in this research topic, Lebière and Anderson demonstrate that judgments are not stable across contexts; as a result, the search their sequence-learning model, reflecting general cognitive processes for higher utility leads to reduced pleasure
Brown and Matthews in response to constraints inherent in the task environment, is supe- show that, at least under certain conditions, rank-based models rior for modeling risky choice in terms of capturing the stability and range-based models are equivalent in that both can account that comes from previous experience
Kusev and van Schaik theory allows the modeling of decision-making phenomena (e.g., argue and provide evidence for the idea that characteristics of (a) the conjunction fallacy and violations of the sure-thing principle), the decision-making context and (b) content, (c) the decision-maker which go beyond classic probability theory, because of the con, and (d) presentatext- and order-dependence in quantum-probability assessment. tion format of task material

Summary

Introduction

Would reflect any relevant constraints in cognitive resources. In this Parducci demonstrates that range-frequency theory implies that spirit, in this research topic, Lebière and Anderson demonstrate that judgments are not stable across contexts; as a result, the search their sequence-learning model, reflecting general cognitive processes for higher utility leads to reduced pleasure. “descriptive” integrative decision-making theories predicts specific alization of preferences as attitudes, whose stability is determined behavioral patterns of risky preferences.

Results

Conclusion