Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing But a Phrase?

Abstract

The idea of human dignity is ubiquitous in the contemporary discourse of human rights. It occupies a prominent place at the beginnings of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 1948. Both international covenants state, in identical passages, that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,” and most of the international human rights instruments adopted subsequently include similar provisions. The Helsinki Final Act goes so far as to say that “all” human rights (“civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other”) “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.” Reflecting thirty years ago about human dignity in international legal thought, an eminent international lawyer could write, “No other ideal seems so clearly accepted as a universal social good.” Although the framers of modern human rights declined to propose a philosophical view about their foundations, many friends of human rights believe that we cannot understand their special importance without a grasp of the value of human dignity. On the other hand, it is easy to be suspicious of the idea that human dignity can do useful work in our thinking about the nature and basis of human rights. It might