Human Dignity in Healthcare: A Virtue Ethics Approach

Abstract

The term ‘dignity’ is used in a variety of ways but always to attribute or recognize some status in the person. The present paper concerns not the status itself but the virtue of acknowledging that status. This virtue, which Thomas Aquinas calls ‘observantia’, concerns how dignity is honoured, respected, or observed. By analogy with justice (of which it is a part) observantia can be thought of both as a general virtue and as a special virtue. As a general virtue observantia refers to that respect for human dignity that is implicit in all acts of justice. As a special virtue it concerns the specific way we show esteem for people. Healthcare represents a challenge to observantia because those in need of healthcare are doubly restricted in expressing their dignity in action: in the first place by their ill health, and in the second place by the conditions required by healthcare (hence the sick are termed ‘patients’ rather than ‘agents’). To be understood properly, especially in the context of healthcare, the virtue of observantia needs both to qualify and to be qualified by the virtue of misericordia, empathy, or compassion for affliction. The unity of the virtues requires a simultaneous recognition of the common dignity and common neediness of human existence.