Human Dignity and the Psychology of Interrogation in Miranda v. Arizona.

Abstract

Miranda v. Arizona, holding confessions obtained during police interrogation inadmissable unless preceded by a full and specific disclosure of a suspect's rights, is perhaps the best known U.S. Supreme Court decision on due process. The decision was built on the twin pillars of human dignity and free will. The Court determined that the intent of the Fifth Amendment is to protect human dignity, and argued that dignity is jeopardized by state actions whose effect is to diminish free will. Consequently, the Court extended the restrictions on police investigators it had been developing since Bram v. United States. In that decision, the Court ruled that confessions could not “be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.” In Miranda, the Court attached the widest possible meaning to “improper influence,” ruling that interrogation is, in itself, an influence against which suspects must be protected by procedural safeguards. It is instructive to reflect on these issues at a time when similar questions are being raised in Canadian courts under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.