Human Dignity and Justice

Abstract

The notion of human dignity has not fared well in contemporary moral philosophy. It seems to have suffered the fate of notions such as virtue and honor, by simply fading into the past.' Yet, in their daily lives, philosophers can sympathize with migrant workers who complain that they cannot live with dignity in the squalid, overcrowded shacks provided by their employers. They can admire and respect the sense of dignity of those American Indians who refuse to leave their reservations because they do not want to become assimilated into the society that has treated them so shamefully. They can understand why blacks feel it is so important that their children develop black pride. They can feel indignation at oppression, exploitation, degradation, and injustice in any of their forms. In short, there is a striking lack of parallel between their philosophical and their practical concern for human dignity. It is not entirely clear why this is so. For some, the notion of human dignity may seem too amorphous, overworked, or unempirical to withstand philosophical analysis. For others, it may conjure up theological specters or the rigorism of Kant. Or it may be simply that moral philosophers have felt other matters to be more pressing. In any case, it would seem that, given the practical pervasiveness of concern for human dignity, they should devote more of their energies to clarifying and appraising that concern. Philosophers seem to mention human dignity most often in their discussions of justice. However, it is typically mentioned only in passing, as