Abstract

ABSTRACT The ubiquitous use of artificial intelligence (AI) can bring about both positive and negative consequences for individuals and societies. On the negative side, there is a concern not only about the impact of AI on first-order discrete individual rights (such as the right to privacy, non-discrimination and freedom of opinion and expression) but also about whether the human rights framework is fit for purpose relative to second-order challenges that cannot be effectively addressed by discrete legal rights focused upon the individual. The purpose of this article is to map the contours and utility of the concept of human dignity in addressing the second-order challenges presented by AI. Four key interpretations of human dignity are identified, namely: non-instrumentalization of the human person; the protection of certain vulnerable classes of persons; the recognition and exercise of inherent self-worth (including the exercise of individual autonomy); and a wider notion of the protection of humanity. Applying these interpretations to AI affordances, the paper argues that human dignity should foreground three second-order challenges, namely: the disembodiment of empiric self-representation and contextual sense-making; the choice architectures for the exercise of cognitive autonomy; and, the experiential context of lived experiences using the normative framework of human vulnerability.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call