Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness: Moral Claims and Epistemic Uncertainty

Abstract

Human brain organoids provide a remarkable opportunity to model prenatal human brain biology in vitro by recapitulating features of in utero molecular, cellular and systems biology. An ethical concern peculiar to human brain organoids is whether they are or could become capable of supporting sentience through the experience of pain or pleasure and/or consciousness, including higher cognitive abilities such as self-awareness. Identifying the presence of these traits is complicated by several factors, beginning with consciousness—which is a highly contested concept among neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers and so there is no agreed definition. Secondly, given human brain organoids are disembodied, there is no practical way to identify evidence of consciousness as we might in humans or animals. What would count as evidence of organoid consciousness is an emerging area of research. To address concerns about consciousness and human brain organoids, in this paper we clarify the morally relevant aspects of human consciousness, phenomenal experience and embodied development and explore the empirical basis of consciousness to develop a defensible framework for informed decision-making on the moral significance and utility of brain organoids, which can also guide regulation and future research of these novel biological systems.