Human altruism: Group selection should not be ignored

Abstract

Explaining altruism is a central theme of sociobiology, and much interest has centred on evolutionary models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma. Furthermore, the existence of this theoretical paradigm has rekindled interest in evolutionary ethics, a field devoted to the implications of evolutionary theory for ethical and moral debates. A recent exchange of articles in the ecological literature was stimulated by a reassessment of evolutionary models of cooperation, in which the authors identified a seeming contradiction between normative ethical statements by prominent evolutionists and the results of the models they are famous for promoting. Although their logic is insightful and intuitively compelling, here I critique their conclusions, arguing that the normative statements considered are not necessarily inconsistent or misguided. Further, I suggest that such discussions of human altruism would benefit from a more serious consideration of the role of group selection, a concept currently undergoing a resurgence of credibility in the evolutionary literature. A deeper understanding of selective influences on human social behavior at all possible levels is vital if evolutionary theory is to responsibly and profitably engage social policy.