How Was British Intelligence Structured by the Time of the Suez Crisis?

Abstract

Understanding the institutional layout of British intelligence is essential not only to assess and trace its performance, but also to establish the context within which the intelligence services operated. Such an understanding demands knowledge of ‘what the underlying rationales are behind its structure and how it fits within the wider governmental machinery’.1 The two intelligence institutions to be assessed here are the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6)2 and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Although the Security Service (MI5) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are also members of the British intelligence community, their activities will not be considered. In the case of MI5 this is because its operational mandate is domestic security focussing on counter-espionage, thus it played no role in the foreign policy venture that was Suez. And in the case of GCHQ there is not enough publicly available evidence of its involvement on which to base any sort of analysis. Cradock also recognises that the case of GCHQ still results in ‘particular obscurity’3 due to secrecy rulings making GCHQ activities even more difficult to trace than those of SIS.