How to Unify Russellian and Strawsonian Definite Descriptions

Abstract

In this paper I will deal with ambiguities in natural language exemplifying the difference between topic and focus articulation within a sentence. I will show that whereas articulating the topic of a sentence activates a presupposition, articulating the focus frequently yields merely an entailment. Based on analysis of topic-focus articulation, I propose a solution to the almost hundred-year old dispute over Strawsonian versus Russellian definite descriptions. The point of departure is that sentences of the form ‘The $$F$$ is a $$G$$ ’ are ambiguous. Their ambiguity stems from different topic-focus articulations of such sentences. Russell and Strawson took themselves to be at loggerheads, whereas, in fact, they spoke at cross purposes. My novel contribution advances the research into definite descriptions by pointing out how progress has been hampered by a false dilemma and how to move beyond that dilemma. The point is this. If ‘the $$F$$ ’ is the topic phrase then this description occurs with de re supposition and Strawson’s analysis appears to be what is wanted. On this reading the sentence presupposes the existence of the descriptum of ‘the $$F$$ ’. The other option is ‘ $$G$$ ’ occurring as topic and ‘the $$F$$ ’ as focus. This reading corresponds to Donnellan’s attributive use of ‘the $$F$$ ’ and the description occurs with de dicto supposition. On this reading the Russellian analysis gets the truth-conditions of the sentence right. The existence of a unique $$F$$ is merely entailed. This paper demonstrates how to unify these disparate insights into one coherent theory of definite descriptions.