Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed (as it led to unacceptable consequences), there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs.
Highlights
The problem of whether beliefs are real was one of the most hotly discussed issues in the metaphysics of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. As it was characterized by Dennett (1991), the three main positions in the debate were: strong realism, represented primarily by Fodor (1985), moderate realism championed by Davidson (1970) and Dennett himself, and eliminativism proposed by Churchland (1981)
Moderate realists want to retain the idea that people have beliefs but without committing themselves to what they see as the problematic presuppositions of strong realism
The traditional formulation of metaphysical skepticism towards the idea that people really do have internal, causally active, semantically evaluable states such as beliefs took the form of the claim that there are no beliefs
Summary
The problem of whether beliefs are real was one of the most hotly discussed issues in the metaphysics of mind in the second half of the twentieth century. My aim here is to try to somewhat undermine this consensus by showing that the debate about the reality of beliefs can be phrased in different terms than it was originally presented In this way, I plan to achieve three important philosophical aims. My definition will introduce some sort of theoretical unity into various debates in the metaphysics of beliefs It should make the debate about the reality of beliefs tractable, at least to an extent: it should provide us with some ways of deciding between realism and a reasonable form of anti-realism. They are bearers of semantic properties: beliefs are usually considered to be those mental states which possess truth-conditions In this way, beliefs might be treated as being states which, speaking somewhat metaphorically, bridge the sphere of causes with the realm of reasons. I will highlight some reasons which might be seen as prima facie supporting the anti-realist option
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