Abstract

It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can have a concept of death. In order to answer this question, I begin by sketching an account of concept possession that favours intensional classification rather than mere extensional discrimination. Further, I argue that the concept of death should be construed as neither binary nor universal. I then present a proposal for a set of minimal conditions that must be met to have a concept of death. I argue that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and then grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility. Lastly, I lay out the sort of observational and experimental evidence that we should look for to determine whether animals have the capacity for a minimal comprehension of death.

Highlights

  • It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death

  • I have argued that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility

  • I have given a list of nine behaviours that ethologists should look for to gather observational evidence of an understanding of death, and provided a rough sketch of how this can be complemented with experimental evidence

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Summary

Introduction

It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death The prevalence of this idea is exemplified by the debate on the ethics of killing nonhuman animals (hereafter ‘animals’). Being good at recognising dead animals has clear survival value Lastly, when it comes to the deaths of infants, being able to understand what happened could allow parents to better process that energy or resources no longer need to be invested in the deceased individual. Due to all of these advantages, it is plausible to think that natural selection may have favoured the development of a concept of death in some nonhuman species These two prima facie reasons are far from definitive.

What Does It Mean to Possess a Concept?
Concept Possession as Intensional Classification
The Concept of Death is Neither Binary nor Universal
The Minimal Concept of Death
The Seven Sub‐components of the Scientific Concept of Death
A Proposal for a Minimal Concept of Death
How Can We Tell If an Animal can Understand Death?
In Search of Observational Evidence of a Concept of Death in Animals
Aggressive behaviour towards corpses
Mourning behaviour towards corpses
Eventual ignoring or abandoning of a corpse
Age or experience-relative difference in behaviour towards corpses
How to Test for Animals’ Concept of Death
Conclusion
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