How to promote the transition of fuel vehicle enterprises under dual credit policy? An improved tripartite evolutionary game analysis with time delay

Abstract

Under the context of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, new energy vehicle (NEV) is considered as ultimate objective in development of automotive industry. To facilitate sustainable growth of automotive market and ensure a smooth transition for fuel vehicle (FV) enterprises, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model based on tripartite Hoteling model, which involving NEV enterprises, FV enterprises and governments. The herd effect and time-delay effect are considered to improve the tripartite evolutionary game. Results indicate that: (1) Fund feedback to NEV enterprises will counterintuitively decrease probability of active assistance from NEV enterprises. (2) Governments’ willingness for strict involvement positively correlates with supervision costs but negatively correlates with additional benefits. (3) Time delay in funds leads to weak effect of high default penalties in promoting active assistance of NEV enterprises in early stage, but opposite situation appears in later stage. (4) Higher NEV production proportion counterintuitively stimulates FV enterprises to give up transition. (5) High rewards drive diffusion of herd effect, further increasing competition among vehicle enterprises leading to FV enterprises giving up transition. (6) Herd effect and time-delay effect increase dependence of FV enterprises on funds results in higher sensitivity of credit trading price compared to credit ratio requirement.