Abstract

As a priority in the water treatment field, industrial wastewater treatment has attracted much attention in China. Although previous studies have pointed out the importance of technological innovation in industrial wastewater treatment, they have not taken into account the complex relationships involved in the subject, resulting in ineffectiveness. To solve this problem, this study innovatively introduces a wastewater treatment service provider and constructs a three-party evolutionary game model by simultaneously considering the penalty mechanism and public participation. An evolutionary stability analysis of each subject was performed, and the initial strategy and sensitivity analysis of the key parameters were explored through numerical simulation. The results of the study are as follows: (1) there was a positive interaction between the behaviors and strategies of the three parties of wastewater treatment; (2) subsidies and penalties can effectively encourage wastewater enterprises and wastewater treatment service providers to choose green behavior; (3) technological innovation in wastewater treatment is the key to reducing additional costs; (4) public supervision and media monitoring have a more obvious impact on governmental strategic decisions. The results of this study can provide a reference for the government to improve incentives and for stakeholders to adjust their strategies for decision support.

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