How to lose allies and finance your enemies: the economisation of conflict termination in Afghanistan

Abstract

Aid-focused approaches to counter-insurgency reflect a belief that large volumes of development assistance may erode insurgent groups' popular support and ability to recruit. In Afghanistan, this ‘economised’ approach to conflict termination, as the author terms it, formed a central component of the international strategy. As insecurity increased, more aid was provided to the most violent areas, creating a series of secondary effects which undermined stability. Firstly and most importantly, aid served to create rather than ameliorate grievances. Poorly conceived programmes, which focused more on volumes of development assistance than the design of interventions, resulted in reduced support among the Afghan citizenry for the international community and nascent state in Kabul. Secondly, ‘economised’ approaches to the insurgency created incentive structures that favoured instability. Thirdly, large aid flows in highly insecure areas led to ‘leakage’ which financed insurgent groups. These findings lend further support to those who increasingly observe that the relationship between security and development is nuanced and that simply proving more aid may in some cases yield less security in conflict-affected contexts.