How to Launch a Powerful Side-Channel Collision Attack?

Abstract

A cryptographic implementation produces very similar power leakages when fed with the same input. Side-channel collision attacks exploit these similarities to establish the relationship between sub-keys and improve the efficiency of key recovery. Benefiting from independence of leakage model, they play an important role in non-profiled setting. However, performance of existing approaches against single collision value is still sub-optimal and optimization is promising. Motivated by this, we first theoretically analyze the mathematical dependency between the number of collisions and the number of encryptions, and propose an efficient side-channel attack named Collision-Paired Correlation Attack (CPCA) to guarantee that the side with fewer samples in a collision is completely paired in low noise scenario. This allows overcoming the inefficient utilization of information in existing works. Moreover, to further employ underlying informativeness, we maximize collision pairs as many as possible. This optimization significantly improves performance of CPCA and thereby extends it to large noise scenarios. Finally, to achieve moderate computational complexity, two equivalent variants of CPCA are investigated to address the potential problem of limited computing resources. Our further theoretical study illustrates that CPCA provides the upper security bound of Correlation-Enhanced Collision Attack (CECA), and experimental results fully verify its superiority.