How to Keep the Playing Field Tilted: Mass Organization and the Durability of Competitive Authoritarianism

Abstract

What factors explain the durability of competitive authoritarian regimes? Extant scholarship downplays incumbent strategies of tilting the electoral playing field, at least partly because the effectiveness of particular strategies is difficult to gauge. Exploiting unusual survey data and an original dataset containing information on 18,037 regime-affiliated Communal Councils, I examine the effects of a common incumbent strategy whose effects remain largely unexplored - the formation of regime-affiliated mass organization - on the incumbent vote in Venezuela's 2006 election. The presence of mass organization has a strikingly large effect on incumbent support. The strength of this effect, however, varies greatly depending on whether organizations distribute patronage. These findings demonstrate that mass organization can play a critical role in competitive authoritarian endurance and suggest the utility of integrating this strategy into explanations of regime change. The findings also suggest that regimes reliant on mass organization may be particularly susceptible to economic shocks.