Abstract

Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification (the Grounded Functionality Account), discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values.

Highlights

  • Some authors doubt the feasibility of a clear distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, and argue that what might be considered an epistemic value in one context might be considered a non-epistemic value in another context (Rooney, 1992, 2017; Longino, 1996)

  • We examine how non-epistemic values can affect the choice between hypotheses regarding the classification of entities in a particular domain, and how they affect the way in which classifications are constructed and formulated

  • We show how the Grounded Functionality Account (GFA) handles the acceptance of classifications according to non-epistemic values and, by comparisons with other accounts of kinds and classification, how the GFA’s machinery works

Read more

Summary

Introduction

In the past few decades the role of values in science has developed into a major topic in philosophy of science (e.g., Longino, 1983, 1990, 1996; Rooney, 1992, 2017; Intemann, 2001; Kincaid et al, 2007; Douglas, 2009, 2016; Elliott, 2017; Elliott & McKaughan, 2014; Elliott & Steel, 2017). A common distinction in the literature is between epistemic (or constitutive) and non-epistemic (or contextual) values (Longino, 1983, 1990, 1996). The former category consists of values that promote the epistemic aims of science; examples include empirical adequacy, simplicity,

Page 2 of 28
Epistemic values and natural kinds
Non‐epistemic values and natural kinds
Page 6 of 28
Page 8 of 28
The Grounded Functionality Account of natural kinds
Page 10 of 28
Page 12 of 28
Page 14 of 28
How the GFA handles decisions on species concepts
Page 16 of 28
Page 18 of 28
Page 20 of 28
The GFA in comparison
Page 22 of 28
Page 24 of 28
Conclusion
Page 26 of 28
Findings
Page 28 of 28

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.