How to Feel About Climate Change? An Analysis of the Normativity of Climate Emotions

Abstract

ABSTRACT Climate change evokes different emotions among the public, bringing about a broad and complex emotional landscape. This gives rise to an additional, yet undertheorized layer of disagreement: there is division of opinion not only about what should be believed regarding climate change, but also about how people should feel about it. The aim of this paper is to clarify this latter type of disagreement by examining the normative reasons in favour of different climate emotions by using some of the main normative criteria for the evaluation of emotions existing in the philosophical and psychological literature. We evaluate some paradigmatic climate emotions—including hope, anxiety, and shame—and climate emotional dilemmas—like how to feel in the face of increasingly warmer summers. We conclude that these normative criteria provide partial reasons in favour or against different climate emotions. The suitability or relevance of each criterion will depend on several considerations. We suggest that emotional disagreement in climate contexts may generate distrust, potentially hindering cooperation for climate action. We propose that we can ease challenges like this if we come to terms with the complex nature of climate emotions and their normative justification.