Abstract
Summary Based on Inman’s (1996) classification of successful fiscal policy rules, we argue that the Stability and Growth Pact suffers from two serious weaknesses: a politicized decision-making process and lack of effective instruments to enforce that Member States adjust their fiscal policies if needed. Although recent changes in the European Union’s governance of national fiscal policy are considered to be an improvement, we argue that they do not address these shortcomings sufficiently. More independent enforcement is needed, and our preferred long-term solution would be to delegate the enforcement of European budgetary rules to a fully independent Budgetary Authority. Once the enforcement by this authority is well established and government debt-to-GDP ratios have declined towards 60%, fiscal discipline could be strengthened even further by introducing well-designed Eurobonds as the capstone of EMU. We propose centrally issued Eurobonds for the full public debt under the condition that Member States will no longer be allowed to independently raise funds in the money or capital markets. The independent Budgetary Authority only distributes funds to Member States if they have sustainable fiscal policies as defined under the SGP or if they properly implement a strictly monitored adjustment program.
Highlights
Nowadays it is generally acknowledged that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) did not enforce sustainable fiscal policies in the Member States of the euro area
We show that the SGP suffers from two serious weaknesses: a politicized decision-making process and lack of effective instruments to enforce that Member States adjust their fiscal policies if needed (Section 2)
We argue that the Fiscal Compact as recently agreed upon by most EU Member States is a step forward in enhancing fiscal discipline in the euro area for two reasons
Summary
Nowadays it is generally acknowledged that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) did not enforce sustainable fiscal policies in the Member States of the euro area. Drawing on the analysis of Alesina and Tabellini (2007), our preferred long-term solution is to delegate the enforcement of European budgetary rules to a fully independent Budgetary Authority (Section 4). This will redress the first shortcoming of the current rules in place (i.e. its politicized nature). The Budgetary Authority will distribute the necessary (Eurobond) funding to the Member States, but only if they have sustainable fiscal policies as defined in the Maastricht Treaty or implement a strictly monitored adjustment programme As even these well-designed Eurobonds may still cause a moral hazard problem, this full mutualisation of risks on Member States’ government debt is only sustainable after other safeguards have been strengthened significantly to prevent that these risks arise.
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