How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character

Alex Silk

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0827-8

Abstract

This paper develops a contextualist account of certain recalcitrant embedding phenomena with epistemic modals. I focus on three prominent objections to contextualism from embedding: first, that contextualism mischaracterizes subjects’ states of mind; second, that contextualism fails to predict how epistemic modals are obligatorily linked to the subject in attitude ascriptions; and third, that contextualism fails to explain the persisting anomalousness of so-called “epistemic contradictions” (Yalcin 2007) in suppositional contexts. Contextualists have inadequately appreciated the force of these objections. Drawing on a more general framework for implementing a contextualist theory (Silk 2016a), I argue that we can derive the distinctive embedding behavior of epistemic modals from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, general mechanisms of local interpretation, and typical features of discourse contexts. Examining embedding phenomena with epistemic modals raises difficult broader issues about conventionalization and pragmatic reasoning, the varieties of context-sensitive language, and the roles of context in interpretation. The paper concludes by briefly examining how the proposed contextualist account compares with certain relativist/expressivist accounts.

Highlights

An important function of language is to share and coordinate our attitudes in communication
Though these theories differ in their details, they agree in distinguishing the context-sensitivity of epistemic modals from that of paradigm context-sensitive expressions
This paper focuses on three prominent objections to contextualism from embedding: first, that contextualism mischaracterizes subjects’ states of mind; second, that contextualism fails to predict how epistemic modals are obligatorily linked to the subject in attitude ascriptions; and third, that contextualism fails to explain the persisting anomalousness of so-called ‘‘epistemic contradictions’’ (Yalcin 2007, 2011) in suppositional contexts

Summary

Introduction

An important function of language is to share and coordinate our attitudes in communication. Many theorists appeal to the distinctive discourse properties and embedding behavior of epistemic modals to motivate revising the compositional semantics or postsemantics Though these theories differ in their details, they agree in distinguishing the context-sensitivity of epistemic modals from that of paradigm context-sensitive expressions. The distinctive claim of contextualism is that the expressive uses of epistemic modals are context-sensitive in the same way as (e.g.) (4) and (7). A thinks it must be raining outside Attitude ascriptions such as (3)/(10b)—call them expressive epistemic attitude ascriptions—present the attitude subject as accepting the information with respect to which the modal is interpreted. It is expressive uses which have been argued to be problematic for contextualism. It is expressive uses which have been argued to be problematic for contextualism. (Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, assume all examples involve expressive uses.)

First-order states of mind

Obligatory shifting

Epistemic contradictions

Embedding solutions

Formal semantics

Conclusion