How to Deter North Korea's Military Provocations

Abstract

This study identifies reasons why North Korea initiates conflicts against South Korea and its allies, and also provides suggestions to deter North Korea’s future provocations. Logistic models with robust standard errors indicate North Korea is likely to adopt hostile foreign policies when it is prior to and following leadership succession and when the United States is involved in a war. Moreover, while the effects of economic factors on North Korea’s or North Korean conflict behavior vary, they become more significant when interacting with both North Korea’s leadership succession and US preoccupation with other world affairs. The findings suggest the following: First, that South Korea should pay extra attention to North Korea when it pursues leadership succession. Second, in addition to solidifying the existing Korea-US military alliance, South Korea should build self-sufficient defense forces for a scenario in which the United States would be unable to provide a security umbrella. To deter North Korea’s repetitive attacks in this context, South Korea primarily needs to change its military doctrine from the ‘deterrence by denial’ to a ‘proactive deterrence strategy.’ Moreover, stealth and C4ISRPGM capabilities are necessary to execute this strategy. Third, South Korea and international societies should help North Korea change its economic infrastructure instead of providing direct humanitarian aid.