How to Conceive of Biogenesis (A Reflection Instead of a Summary)

Abstract

It seems evident that every problem and also that one dealt with in this volume can be considered in a twofold way; namely quasi-objectively, tending to neglect the observer, and subjectively, emphasizing the role of the observer in the description. For both modes of view this volume provides excellent examples. From the quasi-objective standpoint, biogenesis has been treated from the viewpoints of irreversible thermodynamics (8) (11) (12), information theory (4) (16) or even by combining these with the theory of selection (3) (7). Of special importance in this respect is the paper of EIGEN that recently appeared elsewhere (5). How valuable these approaches, especially the last mentioned, ever may be, they are nonetheless able to illuminate the problem from one side only, which by necessity must be supplemented by another one in which is sufficiently enough demonstrated how strongly scientific propositions, mainly those of general character, are influenced by the mode of description (or, even, by the mode of cognition). Indeed, this point has been emphasized by two important papers in this volume (13) (14). This problem ultimately amounts to the question of what must happen in the human mind that enables an origin, i.e. the emergence of the entirely new, to be recognized, and, in addition, treated according to scientific criteria. One has to ponder on whether the recognition of an origin is the result of an active mental construction during the performance of cognition.