Abstract
In this paper, we explore the assumption that blame-attribution can be an effective rhetorical strategy for non-elite interest groups who want power holders to be attentive to their demands. Through a qualitative analysis of two pro-migrant campaigns led by grassroot activists in Sweden, one taking place in 2005 and the other in 2017, we offer a nuanced empirical examination of non-elite initiated blame-games. We show how perceived responsibility influences these blame-games, and explore which policy consequences might emanate from them. We demonstrate that blame-making, under certain conditions, can be a successful strategy to gain policy influence, but that this strategy is conditioned by the complexity and transparency of the institutional arrangements of accountability within the policy sector. The focus on non-elite blame-making in order to change policies enables us to contribute to the theoretical discussion on the relationship between anticipatory and reactive forms of blame-avoidance behaviours, and to discuss the democratic implications of blame-games in both shorter and longer time perspectives. One implication of this study is that successful non-elite blame-making at one point in time actually can lower the chances of successful blame-making in the future.
Highlights
Blame is an important rhetorical weapon in modern political life
Our analysis shows that this problem can temporarily be reduced when these groups manage to use blame-making strategies to get their political demands heard
This brings forth a hitherto neglected democratic aspect of blame-games, namely their potential of providing marginalized interest groups—such as asylum seekers—with a powerful tool to force power holders to be attentive to their demands
Summary
Policy Sciences (2021) 54:41–62 being blamed for causing harm can lead to severe reputational loss, which may imply a loss of legitimacy, position, benefits and future career options (Weaver 1986; Hood 2011; Leong and Howlett 2017). To publicly blame power holders for causing harm of some kind can be an effective strategy for contenders of status quo. Through a qualitative analysis of two pro-migrant campaigns initiated and led by grassroot activists in Sweden, one taking place in 2005 and the other in 2017, we offer a nuanced empirical examination of non-elite initiated blame-games and their consequences. The research questions guiding our analysis are: How do perceptions of responsibility determine the pressure non-elite blame-makers can put on power holders, and which implications do these perceptions have for our knowledge about the conditions for and consequences of blame-games?
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