Abstract

A logic is said to be contraction free if the rule from A → (A →B) to A →B is not truth preserving. It is well known that a logic has to be contraction free for it to support a non-trivial naive theory of sets or of truth. What is not so well known is that if there is another contracting implication expressible in the language, the logic still cannot support such a naive theory. A logic is said to be robustly contraction free if there is no such operator expressible in its language. We show that a large class of finitely valued logics are each not robustly contraction free, and demonstrate that some other contraction free logics fail to be robustly contraction free. Finally, the sublogics of Łω (with the standard connectives) are shown to be robustly contraction free.

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