Abstract
Given Bergmann's skepticism about the importance of propositional justification, before turning to a discussion of the three objections, I want to make clear why I began with a discussion of propositional justification and why that type of justification is interesting. (I will also return to it in the concluding comments.) Recall that I said that a proposition, h, is propositionally justified for S just in case there is an epistemically adequate basis for h that is available to S; and that a belief that h is doxastically justified for S when and only when S is acting in an epistemically responsible manner in believing that h. I said that:
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