Abstract
The paper presents and defends a metadoxastic view on (intentional) consciousness that is novel in four respects: (1) It is motivated both by Husserl’s dynamic approach, which looks upon mental acts as momentary components of certain cognitive structures – “dynamic intentional structures” – in which one and the same object is intended throughout a period of time (during which the subject’s cognitive perspective upon that object is constantly changing) and by his conception of consciousness in terms of internal time-consciousness (temporal awareness). (2) It combines a dispositionalist higher-order judgment theory about the structure of (intentional) consciousness with the claim that the contents of these judgments are such that they can be expressed by essentially indexical sentences containing the temporal indexical “now,” thus accommodating the basic role of internal time-consciousness. (3) It is immune against the “objection from lack of mental concepts” raised, e.g., by Dretske against any higher-order representation theory, as it employs counterfactuals in the framework of a disjunctive account of (intentional) consciousness. (4) It explains the unity of consciousness at a time as well as across time.
Highlights
Reviewed by: Anita Pacholik-Zuromska, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland Kenneth W
The paper presents and defends a metadoxastic view on consciousness that is novel in four respects: (1) It is motivated both by Husserl’s dynamic approach, which looks upon mental acts as momentary components of certain cognitive structures – “dynamic intentional structures” – in which one and the same object is intended throughout a period of time and by his conception of consciousness in terms of internal time-consciousness
If higher-order beliefs about the future build an essential prerequisite, in the way just illustrated, for intentional consciousness – as Husserl argues, focussing on his paradigm example of intentionality, i.e., conscious perception – it is plausible to assume that this consciousness goes hand in hand with higher-order beliefs about the present as well; after all, anticipations about future experience do not drop from the sky
Summary
This theory holds that in order for me to consciously perceive, say, a table, I must make a meta-judgment, to the effect that I am perceiving something as a table. (Where judgments are to be conceived of as momentary belief states that are activated in the course of a cognitive process, such as an observation, rather than as momentary states of intentional consciousness.) This idea can be generalized as follows: Actualist higher-order judgment (thought) theory A given subject is in a conscious intentional state (undergoes an intentional experience) iff the subject judges that he himself, or she herself, is in that state; where this meta-judgment is based upon (is caused or motivated by) that lower-order intentional state. (Where judgments are to be conceived of as momentary belief states that are activated in the course of a cognitive process, such as an observation, rather than as momentary states of intentional consciousness.) This idea can be generalized as follows: Actualist higher-order judgment (thought) theory A given subject is in a conscious intentional state (undergoes an intentional experience) iff the subject judges that he himself, or she herself, is in that state; where this meta-judgment is based upon (is caused or motivated by) that lower-order intentional state. A person who has been driving his car for some hours suddenly “comes to” and realizes that he has not been paying attention to his driving activity for some time He surely must have perceived the street, albeit unconsciously; for otherwise he would have built an accident.. The objection ends, the actualist higher order judgment theory is folk-psychologically and phenomenologically implausible as well
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