How the West Won

Abstract

These two volumes both describe aspects of decision making by the Western Allies in World War II. The similarities largely end there. So disparate seem the scenarios depicted by Warren E Kimball and John D. Chappell that they might be describing separate eras-and perhaps they are. Kimball's major focus is on the development of an English-speaking partnership that made a crucial contribution to the winning of the war in the West. Chappell, in recreating the period between VE Day and the dropping of the atomic bombs barely mentions the British; they are irrelevant. From being partners with the Americans, albeit junior ones, in Europe, the British become witnesses on the sidelines in the Pacific War. FDR's vision of the postwar world that included considerable openness and trust between the major Allies seemingly dies with him. Winston Churchill, cut out of America's inner counsels, piddles around manipulating politics in Greece while the Truman administration sets the stage in the Pacific for the age of the nuclear powers. Actually, the two eras are perhaps not so disparate as they might appear. Kimball maintains that both Roosevelt and Churchill failed to plan adequately for the postwar world and thus set up the vacuum of leadership in which the atomic bombings and the inauguration of the Cold War could take place. Kimball covers much familiar ground in charting the democratic alliance. His contribution is the common sense of his judgments. The United States and Britain were not perfect allies. Each pursued its own national interests; neither was fully candid. But without their cooperation, the war could not have been won. Kimball correctly defends FDR against the charge of dragging the United States into war through aid to the Allies, especially Britain. Thoughtful Americans knew that they could not stay entirely aloof