How the finite follows from the infinite in Spinoza's metaphysical system

Abstract

I shall argue that the notion of "follows from" in Spinoza's Ethics is systematically ambiguous and that it has both logico-metaphysical and causal meanings.1 Similarly, I shall argue that a number of other key notions in Spinoza's system are also systematically ambiguous, involv ing these two meanings, for example, the notions of "existence", "actuality", "necessity", "possibility", "could", and even "infinite intellect". This distinction between logico-metaphysical versus causal meaning is, in this context, an analogue of Leibniz's distinction be tween finite versus infinite analysis. I shall utilize Leibnizian ideas to interpret Spinozistic modality as well as Spinoza's theory of know ledge. Moreover, I shall show that the systematic ambiguity requires bifurcation of various key propositions in the Ethics, for example, Propositions 16 and 33 of Part I, which express Spinoza's Principle of Plenitude and his Principle of Strong Determinism, respectively. I shall also argue that the systematic ambiguity and resulting bifurcation ultimately derive from Spinoza's sharp distinction between the un changing eternal realm and the changing temporal world. It is this duality which fosters such a radical interpretation of Spinoza's Ethics. The problem of finding the sense and manner in which a finite mode follows from an infinite mode or attribute is more severe than one