Abstract
The argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously concludes that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. The paper aims to show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated – that philosophers who endorse its conclusion (especially Douglas and Wilholt) fail to refute two of the most important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to (and not to accept or reject) hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is ambiguous about decisions about how to act and decisions about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, and that qua scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe.
Highlights
It has become customary to divide the process of scientific discovery into three stages or contexts
The second criticism of Jeffrey’s objection says that scientists should accept or reject hypotheses because they are responsible for the actions that are taken on the basis of these hypotheses (Douglas, 2016, pp. 614–5, Wilholt, 2009, p. 94)
I tried to show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated because philosophers who endorse its conclusion fail to refute two of the most important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is ambiguous about decisions about how to act and decisions about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, and that qua scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe
Summary
It has become customary to divide the process of scientific discovery into three stages or contexts. In the context of discovery, objects of investigation are selected in accordance with considerations of relevance; in the context of justification, data are gathered to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses; and in the context of application, hypotheses are applied for various social or political purposes. It is widely agreed that value judgments operate in the contexts of discovery and application. Judgments about the respective value of objects of investigation at least partly determine the selection of these objects, and judgments about the values of social or political purposes play an important role when it comes to applications of scientific hypotheses. It is widely agreed that value judgments necessarily operate in the contexts of discovery and application: that questions of relevance cannot be decided independently of value judgments, and that. I am grateful to Eric Raidl for discussing with me the kernel of the paper, as well as to the editors and anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions
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