How Promotion Incentives and Environmental Regulations Affect China’s Environmental Pollution?

Abstract

As for the academics and policymakers, more attention has been given to the issue on how to reduce environmental pollution through the cooperation of environmental regulation and local officials’ promotion incentives. With the use of a city-level panel data of 266 Chinese cities from 2005 to 2016, this study preliminary explores the impacts of environmental regulations, local officials’ promotion incentives, and their interaction terms on urban environmental pollution at national and regional levels by using the spatial Durbin model. The results indicate that the impacts of environmental regulations and local officials’ promotion incentives on urban environmental pollution have achieved the desired goal with the other’s cooperation, and their interaction term’s coefficients on urban environmental pollution are significantly negative. Moreover, spatial heterogeneity is established, and the uneven development of urban environmental pollution among different regions deserves more attention. In order to effectively reduce the level of urban environmental pollution in China, the government should focus on such solutions as enhancing the implementation and supervision efficiency of environmental regulation, optimizing the performance appraisal system of local officials, improving the synergistic effects of environmental regulations and local officials’ promotion incentives, and establishing a multi-scale spatial cooperation mechanism based on both geographical and economic correlations.