How Polling Trends Influence Compensational Coalition-Voting

Annika Fredén

doi:10.3389/fpos.2021.598771

Abstract

Compensational voting refers to when voters cast a vote for a more extreme party than they prefer, in order to push policies closer to an ideal point. This article develops the idea of compensational voting in regard to pre-electoral coalition signals and polling trends. The argument is that a significant share of voters consider the relative strength of the parties in their preferred pre-electoral coalition, and adjust their vote choice accordingly. This is elaborated by conducting a mixed logit model over eight Swedish general elections where parties were more or less clear about their intentions to collaborate with other parties. Combining unique data from parties’ election manifestos including negative and positive quotes about other parties with polling trends and voters’ approval rating of parties, the analysis lends support to the idea that this type of coalition-oriented compensational voting occurs.

Highlights

Some recent studies have found that a substantive share of voters take coalition formation into account in the vote decision under proportional representation (Blais et al, 2006; Bargsted and Kedar, 2009; Duch et al, 2010; Falcó-Gimeno and Munez, 2017; Bahnsen et al, 2020). Downs (1957) argued that voters take into account the chances that some party will form a government with some other party, and their expected joint policies
The presence of coalition-oriented compensational voting is investigated over eight general elections in which single party governments and coalition governments have taken turns in office, and the parties have become more oriented toward pre-electoral coalition formation
The analyses of party statements in the election manifesto data support the expectation that coalition signals in Sweden have varied over the included elections, adding some level of nuance to the previous picture

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Some recent studies have found that a substantive share of voters take coalition formation into account in the vote decision under proportional representation (Blais et al, 2006; Bargsted and Kedar, 2009; Duch et al, 2010; Falcó-Gimeno and Munez, 2017; Bahnsen et al, 2020). Downs (1957) argued that voters take into account the chances that some party will form a government with some other party, and their expected joint policies. One previous study with a similar take on the vote decision-making process is Kedar (2005), who argues that voters under proportional representation (PR) are more likely to cast a vote for a smaller and more extreme party than the one they prefer, in order to push policies in a certain direction, which is referred to as “compensational” voting. One explanation for this behavior is that some extremism might be needed to avoid policies which are “watered down”. If one of the coalition party’s public support level has decreased, this is a potential incentive to cast a compensational vote for this party, in order to increase the party’s weight in the coalition

MATERIALS AND METHODS

RESULTS

DISCUSSION

ETHICS STATEMENT