How politics can influence the allocation of social program benefits: A case study of the Brazilian poverty reduction program Bolsa Família

Abstract

We investigate the utilization of Bolsa Família, a Brazilian social program aimed at reducing poverty and social inequalities, for electoral purposes. The literature demonstrates that politicians often employ social programs to achieve their political and personal goals. Most of these studies focus on politicians offering benefits from social programs before elections in an attempt to capture votes in the upcoming election. In contrast, our research reveals that social programs can be used as post-election rewards for their voters. This strategy has the potential to be much more effective than the previous one, as it directs rewards only to those who actually produce favorable outcomes for politicians. We employ differences-in-differences models in our tests. Our results indicate that cities electing a ruling party candidate in the 2012 mayoral elections, where the previous mayor is not affiliated with that party, receive more benefits than cities that do not elect ruling party candidates. Similarly, cities with higher percentages of votes in favor of the ruling party in the 2006 presidential elections receive more benefits than cities with lower percentages.