How not to manage crises in the European Union

Abstract

Abstract The process of European integration has often been used as either a model or an anti-model for other regional integration experiences. This article discusses the European Union's shortcomings in crisis management, arguing that valuable ‘how not to’ lessons can be drawn by dissecting the initial stages of the eurozone crisis and the COVID–19 pandemic as ‘moments of truth’. The main policy mistakes committed at the onset of both crises are explored devoting special attention to the role played by the hiatus between research and policy, as well as the inadequacies, biases and hubris of academic analyses. Ideally, comprehensive reforms would be required to equip the EU with the competences and tools needed for effective crisis management. The article concludes that, in the absence of such comprehensive reforms, the only option left to policy-makers engaging in crisis management will be to seek a pragmatic middle ground between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism on a case-by-case basis.