Abstract
In this essay, I seek to clarify and defend a unified account of realism, i.e. a conception of realism that does not only apply to philosophy of science, but also acknowledges how realism is understood in other philosophical disciplines—particularly, how moral realism is treated in metaethics. I will argue that integrating scientific and moral realism is less straightforward than is commonly assumed, due to several substantial, but often unnoticed disanalogies that obtain between both views. As a consequence, scientific realists should consider modifying their traditional understanding and move towards an alternative conception of realism—one that is much more in line with the conception that moral realists usually adopt. Realism (about science or ethics) is, in the final analysis, best characterised as an alethic view which restricts itself to an idea about the objectivity of truth, rather than an epistemic view which underwrites more extensive theses concerning the accessibility of this truth for human knowledge.
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