How (not) to draw philosophical implications from the cognitive nature of concepts: the case of intentionality.

Kazuki Iijima,Koji Ota

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00799

Abstract

Philosophers have often appealed to intuitive judgments in various thought experiments to support or reject particular theses. Experimental philosophy is an emerging discipline that examines the cognitive nature of such intuitive judgments. In this paper, we assess the methodological and epistemological status of experimental philosophy. We focus on the Knobe effect, in which our intuitive judgment of the intentionality of an action seems to depend on the perceived moral status of that action. The debate on the philosophical implications of the Knobe effect has been framed in terms of the distinction between the competence and performance of the concept of intentionality. Some scholars seem to suggest that the Knobe effect reflects the competence (or otherwise, the performance error) of the concept of intentionality. However, we argue that these notions are purely functional and thus do not have philosophical implications, without assuming normativism, which we see as problematic in a psychological methodology. Finally, focusing on the gap between competence and rationality, we suggest future directions for experimental philosophy.

Highlights

COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY Since the beginning of the 21st century, a new research program, “experimental philosophy,” which systematically studies the nature of intuition with psychological methodologies, has become increasingly popular (Knobe and Nichols, 2008a; Alexander, 2012; Knobe et al, 2012; Knobe and Nichols, 2013)
Intentionality attribution, which is the crucial function of our “theory of mind” (ToM), is partly driven by moral cognition in nature and is the result of the appropriate application of the concept of intentionality
If the Knobe effect reflects the competence of the concept of intentionality, we will not observe it in people with AS/HFA who have impairments in the core

Summary

Introduction

COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY Since the beginning of the 21st century, a new research program, “experimental philosophy,” which systematically studies the nature of intuition with psychological methodologies, has become increasingly popular (Knobe and Nichols, 2008a; Alexander, 2012; Knobe et al, 2012; Knobe and Nichols, 2013). The Knobe effect reflects the competence of the concept of intentionality (i.e., the core of ToM) or an error in the performance of it (Alexander, 2012). 30) maintain that “[b]ecause the free will debate is intimately connected to ordinary intuitions and beliefs via these values and practices, it is important that a philosophical theory of free will accounts for and accords with ordinary people’s understanding of the concept and their judgments about relevant cases.” In discussing the general background of experimental philosophy, Knobe and Nichols

Results

Conclusion