How (Meta-)Semantics Defuses Modal Pessimism

Abstract

Kripke argues that we can infer ⬜(a = b), given that we know that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid designators and that a = b. I draw on the meta-semantic category of paradigm terms to expand this template beyond rigid designators and identity statements. I argue that the paradigm term approach defuses moderate modal skepticism or, as I call it, Modal Pessimism. Modal Pessimists hold that our modal knowledge is characteristically limited: although we do know modal truths such as ◇(I pick up that pencil) or ⬜(5 > 2), modal truths such as ⬜(∀x: x is gold ↔ x is Au) or ◇(There are philosophical zombies) are beyond our epistemic ken. I argue that science (uncovering empirical facts) and semantics (identifying paradigm terms) allow us to reliably attain knowledge of modal truths such as ⬜(∀x: x is an Antrodemus ↔ x is an Allosaurus) or ⬜(∀x: x is water ↔ x is H2O). My argument defuses Modal Pessimism even if we grant that it can accommodate the original Kripkean result. It also preempts the topical Pessimist responses to modal rationalism (charging exceptionalism) and to standard modal empiricism (questioning that the respective epistemic abilities suitably project to far-side modal truths).