How Many Ways Are There to Think Morally about War?

Abstract

In both political science and ethics, interpreters of the meaning of war have learned to use typologies to separate one mode of evaluation from another. As a result of this diversity in moral evaluations of war, authors have partly talked past each other, with all good faith accusing each another of confused categories. There has not been an agreed upon definitional base-line for just war theories “out there,” which would permit just war theorists to judge other theories and communicate with each other.I propose to define more carefully the operative terms and kinds of argument used in just war theory, to assist communication on these topics. If we fail to clarify the variety of meanings and arguments, the result is imprecision and confusion. Our need is for a more precise understanding of the diversity of the modes of moral reasoning on just war. By surveying recent developments and usage in the field, this article will make it possible for just war scholars to engage each other using a more adequate, more nuanced set of types. While these types are not identical with current dominant usage, they are reconcilable with its main lines and more useful as instruments of interpretation than the simpler systems.