How macroprudential regulation and board effectiveness interact to shape bank risk-taking behavior

Abstract

This study aims to investigate how macroprudential policies and corporate governance interact to curb bank risk-taking behavior for a sample of 915 publicly listed commercial banks in 53 countries over the 2011–2020 period. Excessive risk-taking by global financial institutions was singled out during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. We first use a fixed-effects OLS panel model. Then, to address endogeneity concerns, we apply a two-step system GMM estimation. Our results show that the impact of board attributes on risk-taking depends critically on MPP’s policies. We find that MPPs can enhance the supervisory power of a board characterized by high independence, and a CEO who performs a dual function. However, a large board size appears to increase bank risk when multiple macroprudential policies are in place, which can result in managerial policies that may increase bank risk-taking. The supervisory role of women on the board is only effective in the presence of tight macroprudential policies. Bank regulators should consider the interaction between corporate governance and macroprudential policies when designing more effective bank regulations.