Abstract
We study how local leaders matter for economic growth by examining the impacts of exogenous rotation of leaders across China’s provinces on inter-provincial land transactions. We show that a local provincial leader attracts investment in industrial land from the province of the leader’s previous position. Moreover, we provide evidence that leaders’ impacts on the land market are due to their political influence rather than market behaviors, and are driven by career concerns rather than rent-seeking.
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