How Hermeneutical is He? A Gadamerian Analysis of Richard Rorty

Abstract

In the final section of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty refers hermeneutics as what will happen once we give up our futile attempts at trying be epistemological. Two of the concepts, and conversation, he develops there substantiate his claims about the viability of hermeneutics remain central in subsequent writings.1 But in what sense are these specifically hermeneutical concepts? Since both have their roots in a Gadamerian hermeneutics,2 I will compare them Gadamer's conceptions, horizon and dialogue, respectively.3 My purpose is show how Rorty's vocabulary glosses over important and deep hermeneutical assumptions made by Gadamer, and that it is Rorty's failure complete his hermeneutical turn that leads some problematic conclusions, conclusions that even Rorty is uncomfortable with. Both Rorty and Gadamer agree that we cannot make sense of what it means attain a position neutral toward our own (Gadamer's term) or (Rorty's term). Rorty builds on Gadamer's claims about the ubiquity of tradition in order emphasize that being fully grounded in one's own community pre-establishes who one regards as adequate interlocutors. To those outside of one's community one simply does not feel the need justify oneself. Rorty names Nazis and three-year olds as examples of those falling into this category. According Rorty, one always has in mind the group of people whom one believes one must justify oneself. This provides him with his definition of ethno-centrism, which he uses modify his earlier use of Ethno-centrism means: to divide up the human race into the people whom one must justify one's beliefs and the others. The first group-one's ethnos-comprises those who share enough of one's beliefs make fruitful conversation possible (Rorty 1991: 30). One is happily ethno-centric when one admits that there is no or meta-audience whom one can justify oneself but only audiences one deems competent, based on the assumptions of one's very own community. Admitting the circularity implied therein, Rorty retorts that this is a circularity no-one can avoid. Consequently, instead of directing our philosophical energy towards justifying ourselves an ideal or universal community, Rorty advocates that we use our energy justify ourselves our own local, contingent community. Practically, this means that rather than putting our faith in the possibility of achieving rational convergence with all humanity past, present and future-the of traditional philosophy-we should spend our energy cultivating hope, a hope that our liberal community will triumph and spread inclusion rather than exclusion, tolerance rather than violence. True his pragmatic sensibilities, Rorty conjectures that the real fear behind forsaking epistemological commitments is that it will lead political chaos. We may not, for example, be able justify Western enlightenment liberalism against totalitarianism. That is say, there is no possibility for a non-circular argument that proves our starting point is better than the Nazi's. Contextually-based opinions are all we can garner demonstrate (as opposed rationally argue) that liberalism is better than totalitarianism. Rorty insists that rather than seeking metaphysical comfort by vainly attempting construct a universally valid foundation, what we need instead is develop hope, bravery, and honesty face up the fact that there is no non-circular argument in defense of any belief. It is Rorty's emphasis that there is no justification period (i.e., an community) only justification for us (i.e., local communities) that leads him deny that changes of belief amongst communities can be rational. This is due the fact that rationality is so wedded the internal norms and assumptions of a community that when it comes substantive change amongst communities the difference between reasons and causes collapses: There is . …