Abstract
ABSTRACTThe aim of this study is to examine how board composition affects dividend policies. Concretely, we analyse the effect of institutional directors on boards, also differentiating between pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors. Furthermore, the impact of foreign directors is also examined. The findings show that institutional and foreign directors on boards affect dividend policies positively, suggesting that these directors are more likely to mitigate agency costs. Additionally, the results report the relevant monitoring role that pressure-sensitive directors play, since they impact positively on dividend policies, while pressure-resistant directors show no effect. Thus, institutional directors should not be considered as a uniform group.
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