How Firms Transfer Financial Risks to Employees: Stock Price Volatility and CEO Power

Abstract

Purpose - We investigate how firms transfer financial risks to employees in a form of flexible employment contracts and layoffs. Design/methodology/approach - Based on the literature on the prevalence of shareholder value ideology and the associated ‘risk shift’, we examined how stock price volatility is associated with a firm’s use and hiring of nonstandard employees, and the number of employees lay-offed. We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal, multi-source, dataset of Korean firms from 2003 to 2011. Findings - We found support for the relationship between stock price volatility and flexible employment contracts and layoffs after controlling for actual risks such as increased debt or decreased sales. However, we found that the relationship is moderated by the power of professional CEOs relative to that of shareholders, in that powerful CEOs are more likely to transfer the external risks, i.e. stock price volatility, to employees. Research implications or Originality - This study contributes the emerging stream of literature that explore the effect of stock market pressures and governance structures on human resource management.