How Ficta Follow Fiction

Abstract

ionism than Rapaport for, according to the former, guises are concrete rather than abstract entities. See next section.entities. See next section. abstract entities explains their nonexistence in that it takes them to be actually but non-spatiotemporally existing entities. Furthermore, making them into sets of properties—those properties which are assigned to them in the relevant narration—rather than generic objects accounts more effectively both for their being incomplete entities and for the analytical character of the sentences in which these properties are ascribed to them. Moreover, taking those properties to be ascribed to ficta in the internal mode of presentation allows us to explain why one and the same property can be possessed both by an actually spatiotemporally existing object and by an actually non-spatiotemporally existing object such as a fictum. For the actually spatiotemporally existing object possesses externally what the fictum possesses at least internally. I say “at least” because a fictional object may also possess properties externally, sometimes the very same properties it also possesses internally. Finally, once this “internal/external” mode of predication distinction applies to ficta taken as sets of properties, it is not baffling at all. Although external predication is ordinary exemplification, as regards both ficta and actually spatiotemporally existing individuals internal predication is just set-membership: a property is possessed internally by a fictum iff it belongs to the property set that constitutes that fictum.entities explains their nonexistence in that it takes them to be actually but non-spatiotemporally existing entities. Furthermore, making them into sets of properties—those properties which are assigned to them in the relevant narration—rather than generic objects accounts more effectively both for their being incomplete entities and for the analytical character of the sentences in which these properties are ascribed to them. Moreover, taking those properties to be ascribed to ficta in the internal mode of presentation allows us to explain why one and the same property can be possessed both by an actually spatiotemporally existing object and by an actually non-spatiotemporally existing object such as a fictum. For the actually spatiotemporally existing object possesses externally what the fictum possesses at least internally. I say “at least” because a fictional object may also possess properties externally, sometimes the very same properties it also possesses internally. Finally, once this “internal/external” mode of predication distinction applies to ficta taken as sets of properties, it is not baffling at all. Although external predication is ordinary exemplification, as regards both ficta and actually spatiotemporally existing individuals internal predication is just set-membership: a property is possessed internally by a fictum iff it belongs to the property set that constitutes that fictum. These are all positive results, ones that a satisfactory theory of fictional objects must include. Yet they are insufficient. Being a certain set of properties is definitely a necessary condition for the individuation of a fictum since the set is one of its constituents; change the set and you obtain a different fictum.73 No matter which property is internally possessed by a fictum, insofar as that property is a member of the set which constitutes that fictum, if that entity had not possessed that property it would not have been that fictum. It is quite obvious that Yolanda, the daughter of the Black Corsair, could not have failed to be the Corsair’s offspring (by being instead his niece, or someone else’s daughter). But this heroine in one of Emilio Salgari’s adventure novels, very popular in countries where Romance language are spoken, could not even have been such, that the Corsair had not bestowed that name on her (but, say, had named her “Concetta”). Both being generated by the Corsair and being called “Yolanda” are indeed for Salgari’s heroine internally possessed properties, hence members of the set constituting that character. However, being a certain set of properties is not a sufficient condition for a fictum’s individuation. In this respect, two problems arise. First, there may be a property set without any fictum (I call this the “no-ficta” problem). Second, one and the same property set may be 31 The Committal Theories (I) 73 For this thesis, cf. Parsons (1980: 28).