Abstract

Abstract We study the speed with which investors learn about managers’ skills by examining how quickly investor and managers’ beliefs converge. After showing our measure proxies for the change in the dispersion of beliefs, we find that hedge fund investors learn as fast as suggested by Bayes’ rule. However, we find mutual fund investors learn more slowly than suggested by Bayes’ rule. Mutual fund investors’ slow learning is not due to the use of different performance measures, institutional frictions, or lack of sophistication, but could be due to a low payoff from learning. Our results indicate learning speed depends on financial participants’ incentives. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

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