Abstract

This short introductory paper explains the broader research setting from which the idea for this symposium arose. I then summarise the arguments mounted by Simon Hope and Kofi Quashigah respectively. Taking a philosophical perspective, Hope asks whether insisting on the language of human rights when broaching issues of historical injustice may not risk misunderstanding the nature of the original wrong. Quashigah analyses the legal conundrums facing modern African states when in seeking to comply with international human rights requirements they risk further alienating members of traditional societies whose own sense of justice is often violated by fulfilment of those requirements. Both papers explore, from different disciplinary perspectives, the limits of morally defensible human rights reasoning. I briefly consider possible responses to each set of reflections from proponents of ‘orthodox’ and ‘political’ human rights reasoning respectively.

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