How evolutionary game could solve the human vaccine dilemma

Abstract

Competitive and cooperative human traits that have detrimental effects on epidemic aspects can be regarded as a social dilemma. Often applied to intervention policy and epidemic incentive, evolutionary game theory can be imperative for predicting human behavior and social dilemma that improve health traits regarded as a vaccine-preventable intervention. Here, we consider the pairwise game as a decision mechanism, modeling coupled epidemic dynamics with the game aspect of the associated vaccine-preventable disease such as seasonal influenza. This work progressively investigates several vaccine effectiveness models and vaccine contact-reduction models under individual-based risk assessment, society-based risk assessment, and replicator dynamic, which then inspect for repeated season framework. In the context of social dilemma, it also explores the idea of dilemma strength (DS) and social efficiency deficit (SED) by allowing the evolution of the preference of vaccine strategies besides risk perception. Vaccine effectiveness plays an imperative role in increasing vaccine uptake in the prisoner's dilemma classes; however, in the cases of chicken and stag-hunt, the prevalence of vaccine uptake depends on the level of reliability and the extend of anxiety and selfishness. These model and findings have clear implications for policymakers to endorse adequate provisions that reduce social deficiency hidden in the complex situation.