How does the power structure affect the acquisition price and inventory decisions in the reverse supply chain

Abstract

With growing concerns about environmental sustainability, reverse supply chains play a crucial role in recycling, remanufacturing, and reducing waste. Investigating the power structure's impact on decisions related to acquisition prices and inventory management can provide insights into the integration of sustainable practices. This paper analyzes a reverse supply chain with a supplier and a remanufacturer, in which the supplier provides the remanufacturer with sorted used cores. We investigate the acquisition pricing and inventory decisions under different power structures (supplier-led Stackelberg model, remanufacturer-led Stackelberg model) through game theory analysis. We first establish the centralized model to explore optimal acquisition decisions and profit of the total system. Then we evaluate the acquisition quantity, wholesale prices, the profit of supplier and remanufacturer in the supplier-led model and in the remanufacturer-led model. Finally, the impact of power structure on the performance of supplier and remanufacturer are explored by numerical analysis, as well as the supply chain system. Our significant findings show that (i) the total profit of the supplier-led and remanufacturer-led reverse supply chain are less than the centralized model due to the double marginalization; (ii) the remanufacturer-led reverse supply chain is superior to the supplier-led model reverse supply chain; (iii) the selected grades in the supplier-led model is proved the same as that in the remanufacturer-led model, which could not been affected by the wholesale price; (iv) the greater the inventory risk (the uncertainty in demand), the greater the profit share for the remanufacturer (supplier) in the supplier-led (remanufacturer-led) model.