Abstract
In this paper, a model containing two manufacturers of different market competitiveness retailing products in the carbon emissions trading market with competition was established. Among them, a manufacturer is in a limited market leadership position and intermediate state between the Stackelberg game and the Cournot game. Furthermore, the impact of the government's dynamic adjustment of carbon emission limits was studied in the model. The paper analyzes the sources of system instability and the influences of various parameters on the stability of the model under this competitive mode. The impact of government adjustment strategies on retailing decisions and stability is also analyzed. The results show that the instability of the system is mainly derived from the adjustment strategy of the leading manufacturer, and the stronger the leadership position is that the more instable the system will be. At the same time, the government's restrictions on carbon emission limits will also increase market instability
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
