“How does the Cognitive Science of Religion Stack Up as a Big Theory, À La Hume?”

Abstract

ion has proved invaluable. But one cannot infer from Chomsky's work, for example, that because our language performance depends on a language competence, that therefore the best model for understanding utterances is that we formulate representations of sentences and then use our will to make them public. And a full theory of language must complement Chomsky's generative theory with an account of the situ ation in which we speak and the meaning of utterances. Often we blurt things out. It is usually in the attempt to express in thought or writ ing that the ideas we are trying to bring out are clarified and shaped. Language competence is stored in individual minds, but language is irreducibly social. I am arguing that our gain in knowledge by abstract ing ritual competence from ritual performance does not justify the assumption that in action, including ritual action, what happens is that people read off their representations as blueprints that their actions put into play. Human agency requires more than competence. It is important to recall how young the cognitive science of religion is. It was launched in 1990 by Lawson and McCauley's book on ritual. Much of the empirical cognitive basis has been driven by the work of Justin Barrett, a psychologist, whose work only began to appear in 1996. It may, then, simply be too early for this approach to attempt a comprehensive theory of religion. That does not stop it from claiming to have done so (see Pascal Boyer's Religion Explained). Some of the grander claims for its achievements may be in danger of crowding out honest and hard reflections on the comprehensiveness of what has been done so far, reflections that will be the stimulus to further success. Theodore Vial, Iliff School of Theology 2201 S. University Blvd Denver, CO 80210